Utah Department of Transportation v. G. Kay Inc. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
Utah Department of Transportation v. G. Kay Inc. :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward O. Ogilvie; Asisstant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
the Plaintiff/Appellee.
George K. Fadel; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation v. G. Kay Inc., No. 20020063.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2091
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
G. KAY INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020063-SC 
Priority No. 15 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS, MORGAN AND WEBER COUNTIES, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE GLENN R. DAWSON. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
EDWARD O. OGILVIE (2452) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
1 XV 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION REQUESTED 
GEORGE K. FADEL (1027) 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)295-2421 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
G. KAY INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020063-SC 
Priority No. 15 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS, MORGAN AND WEBER COUNTIES, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE GLENN R. DAWSON. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
EDWARD O. OGILVIE (2452) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
GEORGE K. FADEL (1027) 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)295-2421 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page(s) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. DEFENDANT HAS RAISED ISSUES NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT ON APPEAL 9 
II. CONDEMNATION OF MITIGATION PROPERTY IS 
AUTHORIZED UNDER UTAH LAW 16 
III. CONDEMNATION OF DEFENDANT'S MITIGATION 
PROPERTY IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO AN 
AUTHORIZED PUBLIC USE 21 
IV. DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO RAISE ISSUES OF 
FEDERAL LAW, NOR ARE FEDERAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THIS 
APPEAL 24 
CONCLUSION 29 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 31 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 
846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993) 3,4 
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 
930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 11 
Ashton v. Ashton. 
733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987) 24 
Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) 18 
Christensen v. Munns. 
812 P2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 25 
Ellis v. Swensen, 
16 P.3d 1233 (Utah 2000) 15 
Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 
119 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1941) 18 
Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co.. 
421 P.2d 504 (Utah 1966) 20 
Hanes v. State, 
973 P.2d 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) 26 
In re Bartell, 
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) 24 
Ledford v. Corps of Eng'r of the United States. 
500 F.2d 26,28 (6th Cir. 1974) 18,19 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 
783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 24 
ii 
Nash v. Clark, 
75 P. 371 (Utah 1904), aff d, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) 18 
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 
988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 11 
Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
809 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 11 
People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett 
13 Mich. 137 (1865) 20 
People v. Matelec, 
641 N.W. 2d 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) 19, 20 
People v. Morey, 
603 N.W. 2d 250 (1999) 19 
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 
65 P. 735 (1901) 21 
Saunders v. Sharp, 
793 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 12, 23, 24 
Shire Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 
799 P.2d 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 13 
Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'r, 
121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) 26, 27 
State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 15 
State Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Company, 
789 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 1990) 28 
State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 14 
iii 
State v. Lopez. 
886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) 14 
State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 14 
State v. Kruger. 
6 P.3d 1116, (Utah 2000) 11 
State v. Bryant, 
965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 15, 16 
State v. Walker. 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 24 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 
786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) 24 
Timm v. Dewsnup. 
921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) 4 
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 
22 P.2d 343 (Utah 1933) 18 
U.S. v. Dunkel. 
927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991) 15 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.. 
870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) 3, 4 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.. 
474 U.S. 121 (1985) 27 
Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 
31 P.2d 624 (Utah 1934), cert, denied, 295 U.S. 742 (1935 18 
Utah v. United States. 
403 U.S. 9 (1971) 28 
IV 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller. 
603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978) 20,22 
Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons, 
602 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1979) 21,22 
Williamson v. Opsahl. 
416 N.E.2d 783 (111. App. 1981) 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1996) 5,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0') (Supp. 2001) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-102 (2001) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (2001) 5, 6, 8, 10, 16, 20, 29 
Ut. R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) (2001) 13 
Ut. R. App. P. 24 (5)(a) (2001) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-11-17 (1997) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(1) (2001) 13 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-2(2) (1996) 15, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(2)(a)(i) (2001) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-201(4) (2001) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1 (1996) 17 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
1 Nichols on Eminent Domain 21 
v 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
G. KAY INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020063-SC 
Priority No. 15 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY OF SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS, MORGAN AND WEBER COUNTIES, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE GLENN R. DAWSON. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, by and through counsel, submits the 
following brief: 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action arises out of a condemnation proceeding initiated by the Plaintiff, Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT), against parcels of real property owned by 
Defendant, G. Kay, Inc. in Davis County in connection with the Legacy Highway project. 
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The parcels include land within the roadway right-of-way and also wetlands within the 
planned Legacy Parkway Project, which the state needed both to mitigate the impacts of 
highway construction and to meet the requirements of federal wetlands mitigation law, 
and for wildlife protection. Although defendant has stipulated to occupancy and 
condemnation of the parcel(s) underlying the roadway, it contests the state's right to 
condemn the parcels needed for wetlands mitigation and the other purposes described 
above. 
UDOT's Complaint and Motion for Immediate Occupancy were filed in the 
Second Judicial District Court on June 20, 2001. (R. 1-21). Defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy 
and the Affidavit of Kia F. Hodgson (R 28) on June 29, 2001 (R. 22-32) claiming that 
UDOT had not satisfied the conditions precedent to taking under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-4 (1996). In response, UDOT filed an Affidavit of Byron Parker, Legacy 
Parkway Project Director (R. 46-156), and a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy (R. 168-195). Following a period of discovery (R. 162-166), the court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motions on November 9, 2001 (R. 224-225) which, by result 
of earlier stipulations (R. 209-211), was limited to UDOT's right to take the contested 
parcels. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted UDOT's Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 225), and subsequently 
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entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 234-236) and an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy (R. 256-258). Defendant filed a timely Petition for Permission to 
File Interlocutory Order on January 25, 2002 (R. 276-281). This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001) as a case not within 
the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. The District Court correctly concluded in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that the acquisition of property for mitigation constitutes an 
authorized, lawful basis for condemnation. 
2. The District Court correctly concluded in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that the mitigation property sought in this action may be lawfully 
occupied or acquired by the Utah Department of Transportation as necessary and requisite 
to a state transportation purpose. 
3. The District Court correctly determined each finding of fact found in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The trial court's granting of the Motion for Immediate Occupancy involved "both 
factual and legal determinations. [The Supreme Court] review[s] the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). [The 
Supreme Court] review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according no 
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deference to the trial court. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 
P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). In addition, an appellant must properly marshal the evidence 
to permit review of the trial court's findings. Alta Indus. Ltd., 846 P.2d at 1286." Timm 
v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1391 (Utah 1996). 
The standard for reviewing the court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
not so simple. The parties offered, and the court considered, matters outside the 
pleadings, including the Parker Affidavit and the sworn testimony at the hearing. It did 
not consider, however, the Affidavit of Kia F. Hodgson, to which the state had objected 
(R. 28). Rule 12(b) requires the trial court to consider such a motion under the provisions 
of Rule 56. Denial of summary judgment must be sustained where the court finds a 
genuine issue as to any material fact, or where the movant is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, which the court reviews for correctness. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to issues 
before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action arises out of a condemnation proceeding initiated by Plaintiff, the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT), in which UDOT seeks land from Defendant G. 
Kay, Inc. for the Legacy Highway Project and Legacy Nature Preserve. UDOT's 
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Complaint and Motion for Immediate Occupancy were filed in the Second Judicial 
District Court on June 20, 2001 (R. 1-21). 
Defendant responded with a Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs 
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on June 29, 2001 (R. 22-32) on grounds that 
UDOT had not satisfied the conditions precedent to taking under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
34-4, including a claim that mitigation was not included as a "highway purpose" under 
Utah code Ann. § 72-3-102 (2001) (R 22 - 32). Subsequently, UDOT filed an Affidavit 
of Byron Parker, Legacy Project Director (R 46 - 156) on August 9, 2001, and a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on September 17, 2001 (R. 168-
195) in which UDOT argued that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 had been amended 
effective March 9, 2001 to specifically provide for mitigation of impacts from 
transportation projects, that condemnation of Defendant's property was necessary to an 
authorized public purpose, and that cooperation with federal officials was irrelevant to 
disposition of any issues before the Court. 
Following discovery (R. 162-166), an evidentiary hearing on the motions took 
place on November 9, 2001 (R. 224-225). As a result of a prior Stipulation for Order of 
Immediate Occupancy as to right-of-way property, however, the November 9 hearing (R. 
224-225) was limited to UDOT's right to take Defendant's property for mitigation. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted UDOT's Motion for Immediate 
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Occupancy, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and stated its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 225). The Court subsequently entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 234-236) and an Order of Immediate Occupancy (R. 256-258) on 
January 14, 2002. Defendant thereupon filed a timely Petition for Permission to File 
Interlocutory Appeal on January 25, 2002 (R. 276-281). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The Legacy Parkway Project, out of which this action arises, is a state funded 
transportation project encompassing a highway of approximately 14 miles between 1-215 
in North Salt Lake and the I-15/U.S. 89 Interchange in Farmington, and land for the 
Legacy Nature Preserve of approximately 2,100 acres (R. 47). As described in UDOT's 
Condemnation Resolution, Defendant's property of approximately 32.71 acres is sought 
for the purpose of mitigating the impacts from a public transportation project and 
mitigating the effects of construction as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (R. 5-8). 
During its 2001 legislative session, the Utah Legislature authorized and appropriated 
funds for acquisition of property and construction of the Legacy Project (R. 48). The 
Legacy Nature Preserve was proposed by the Governor and UDOT to accommodate the 
interests of the state of Utah in the protection of wetlands, wildlife habitat, and other 
natural resource values (R. 47). As originally proposed and described in UDOT's 
application to the Army Corps of Engineers for a permit under Section 404, the Legacy 
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Nature Preserve had approximately 1,298 acres, but was later expanded to approximately 
2,100 acres (R. 47-48). 
In order to connect with the Interstate Highway and National Highway Systems at 
each terminus, approval was needed from the Federal Highway Administration (R. 48). 
Also, because the Legacy Parkway involves the filling of wetlands regulated under the 
Clean Water Act, a permit was required from the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers under 
Section 404 of the Act (R. 48). The objectives of the Legacy Nature Preserve include 
providing lands to mitigate the Project's impact to wetlands, wildlife, and open space by 
acquiring and preserving lands identified as important wetlands and adjacent uplands in 
the area of the Project, and by acquiring and preserving for later improvement lands that 
are susceptible to being adapted for wildlife and wetland habitat (R. 49-50). 
The contested 32.71 acres of G. Kay mitigation property at issue here was added 
on to the original 1,298 acre Legacy Nature Preserve in order to help meet or satisfy 404 
Permit requirements (R. 50). The property was selected because it was suitable for the 
Preserve and contiguous to other areas that Utah considered suitable (R. 50). In 
accordance with the mitigation plan prepared to mitigate the effects of highway 
construction, both direct and indirect impacts were evaluated and quantified in 
accordance with accepted methodology. Hearing on Motions, November 9, 2001, TR at 
23-24; 27-29; 35-36. The mitigation properties selected, including Defendant's property, 
were located on the west side of the roadway as close to where impacts occurred as 
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possible. TR at 30. As a property that was identified as meeting the criteria developed for 
the selection of mitigation properties, TR at 47, 56-57, the G. Kay property includes both 
wetlands and uplands. TR at 57. Wetlands are preserved in highest productivity when 
both uplands and wetlands are taken in combination. TR at 107. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issues properly before the Court on interlocutory appeal are limited to whether 
the taking of Defendant's property for mitigation is authorized under state law and 
whether the taking was necessary to an authorized public use. Other issues raised over 
whether UDOT may condemn water rights, whether UDOT may acquire fee title by 
eminent domain, and whether Defendant is entitled to interest on funds deposited into 
court but not withdrawn were not raised in the District Court and may not be considered 
for the first time on appeal. Based on the 2001 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
102, UDOT has been granted condemnation authority for purposes of mitigation. Where 
a public use has been authorized by the Legislature, the law requires that the statute be 
liberally construed in furtherance of that purpose. In the present case, the plain language 
of the statute is clear and unambiguous and the powers delegated to UDOT are entirely 
appropriate and well within established legal precedent. The District Court's findings 
that the selection criteria required by the state of Utah were met, and that the taking was 
requisite and reasonably necessary to an authorized state use, are based on an extensive 
record of unrebutted evidence and expert testimony considered by the District Court at the 
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evidentiary and motions hearing held in November 2001. None of the federal issues 
raised by the Defendant in this action are relevant to this appeal. UDOT's right to 
condemn is governed by state law. Moreover, the Army Corps of Engineers is not a party 
to this action and jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers over wetlands may not be 
determined in state court. Although the state of Utah is not precluded by law from 
working and cooperating with federal agencies, UDOT has nevertheless exercised its own 
discretion and judgment in determining the quality, quantity and location of property to be 
selected for mitigation. Accordingly, cooperation with federal agencies in planning or 
implementing mitigation does not in any way bar UDOT from selecting and taking 
Defendant's property. Finally, Defendant's interpretation and application of federal law 
is erroneous and does not in any way support the contention that the Army Corps of 
Engineers does not have jurisdiction over wetlands located within or adjacent to the 
Legacy Parkway Project. 
For the foregoing reasons, and as more fully explained below, the Order and 
Findings of the District Court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT HAS RAISED ISSUES NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT ON APPEAL 
Based on the legal memorandums and the evidence presented by the parties at 
hearing, the District Court rendered the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the acquisition of property for mitigation constitutes an 
authorized, lawful basis for condemnation pursuant to U.C.A. § 72-5-102 
et. seq. 
2. That funding has been budgeted and appropriated for the 
acquisition of land or properties for the Legacy Highway Project. 
3. That the Legacy Highway Project is proceeding in a timely 
manner in accordance with a set schedule or timetable, and that 
approximately 70% or more of the required properties for the project have 
already been acquired or occupied. 
4. That Defendant's property meets the selection criteria for 
mitigation property required or needed by the State of Utah for the Legacy 
Project and Nature Preserve. 
5. That the acquisition of Defendant's property for mitigation in 
this matter is requisite and reasonably necessary to an authorized state 
transportation purpose. 
6. That Defendant's property is needed by or about the end of 
the year 2001. 
7. That the Court adopts and incorporates in its findings the in-
court and affidavit testimony of Legacy Project Manager Byron Parker. 
8. That there is no evidence of bad faith, fraud, or any abuse of 
discretion by the State of Utah or Utah Department of Transportation in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The law governing the taking of property by the Utah 
Department of Transportation for mitigation purposes in this matter 
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constitutes a state transportation purpose in accordance with U.C.A. § 72-5-
101 et. seq.1 
2. Acquisition of the mitigation property sought in this action 
may be lawfully occupied or acquired by the Plaintiff, Utah Department of 
Transportation, as necessary and requisite to a state transportation purpose. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R. 282-284). 
Defendant's counsel approved as to form (R. 36) and did not contest the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the District Court, including (2) that funding 
has been budgeted and appropriated; (3) that Legacy was proceeding in a timely manner; 
(4) that Defendant's property met the selection criteria needed for Legacy; (7) 
incorporation in findings of affidavit and in-court testimony of Byron Parker; and, (8) no 
evidence of bad faith, fraud, or abuse of discretion. Under the jurisprudence of Utah's 
appellate courts, "[i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and 
abandoned." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930P.2d 1182, 1185 
n.5 (Utah 1996) (Citing Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746, 751 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Pasquin v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting American Towers). Further, pointing out these omissions in a response does not 
permit Defendant to cure them in their reply brief. See State v. Kruger, 6 P.3d 1116, 
1120 (Utah 2000) (where State observed that appellant had failed to raise issues in his 
opening brief, "[tjhat observation by the State did not constitute a 'new matter' entitling 
]In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court mistakenly cited to 
§75-5-101. 
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[appellant] to brief the issue in his reply brief). The foregoing Findings of Fact may also 
be deemed conclusive on grounds that Defendant has failed to marshal evidence to 
"demonstrate that the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence." Saunders v. 
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
More importantly, the very need for and existence of genuine issues of material 
fact preclude this court from reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing the case. At the hearing below, Defendant's counsel 
agreed that the only issues before the Court were whether the taking was authorized by 
State law and whether the taking was necessary to an appropriate purpose: 
THE COURT: How will this (examination regarding legislative process) 
help me with regard to the matter before the Court. . . whether the taking is 
authorized by State law and whether the taking is necessary for appropriate 
purpose? 
MR. FADEL: That's true, your honor. . . . 
THE COURT: I think those are the only issues before me. 
MR. FADEL: That's true 
TR at 99. 
Despite the foregoing representation, Defendant has raised issues not properly 
before this Court, including an issue at paragraph 4 of its Statement of Issues for Review, 
over "[w]hether UDOT's power of eminent domain extends to private water rights (R. 6-
12 
7)." The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law make no reference to 
"water rights," and Defendant's record designation at "R 6-7" references "water rights" 
only in the context of UDOT's Condemnation Resolution. Thus, no record has been 
shown that any issue over water rights was ever preserved for appeal. As stated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Shire Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), "[w]e have reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on appeal 
for the first time." Further, in addition to making factual representations which are 
neither cited to nor supported by the record, Defendant has made no attempt to show or 
explain how the District Court allegedly erred, as required by Ut. R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) 
(2001). But even on the merits, the contention that UDOT has no right to acquire water 
rights is baseless, because Utah Code Ann. §63-11-17 (1997) is applicable to the powers 
and duties of the Board and Division of Parks and Recreation, and has no application to 
UDOT. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(1), UDOT is specifically authorized 
to acquire any real property interests, without limitation: 
"The department may acquire any real property or interests in real property 
necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state transportation 
purposes by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or 
otherwise." 
Inasmuch as water rights clearly constitute a property interest subject to 
condemnation, the statutory authority and cases cited by Defendant in its argument have 
no bearing on UDOT's right to condemn water rights and need not be considered on 
appeal. 
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Defendant's Statement of Issues, paragraph 3, alleges: "[ W]hether paragraph 4 of 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy that 'the funds as deposited do not incur interest, and 
in the event Defendant does not withdraw said funds, the Defendant shall waive interest 
or otherwise obtain an Order of the Court providing for payment of funds into an interest 
bearing account' . . . is constitutional or otherwise proper." Here again, there is no 
Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law on this issue, and no showing that any such issue 
was ever raised below, either at hearing or by motion. With regard to record 
designations, "R 256 - 258" is the Order of Immediate Occupancy, signed by the District 
Court and approved as to form by Defendant's counsel; "R 268," is Defendant's 
"Objection to Paragraph Four of Proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy;" and "R 274" 
is a letter to the Clerk of the District Court transmitting a deposit fee to the court clerk for 
transfer into an interest bearing account of the "$370,308.00 previously deposited with 
the clerk by UDOT, representing the appraised value of the Defendant's property. 
None of the above citations to the record raises the issue presently claimed, nor is 
there any motion or request for ruling on an issue over whether deposit of funds was 
"constitutional or otherwise proper," as now raised for the first time on appeal. "It is a 
well established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is 
generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); and State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Cl. App. 1991)). The reason that an appellate 
14 
court generally will not review an issue not raised in the Court below " . . . is based, in 
part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial Court for failing to rule correctly on 
an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233, 
1241 (Utah 2000). 
At Point IV of its brief, Defendant raises an argument captioned: "The Legacy 
Nature Preserve is Not a Public Use for Which UDOT can Acquire Fee Title by Eminent 
Domain." This in turn is followed by a single sentence assertion which states that, "A 
Legacy Nature Preserve for which wildlife to the exclusion of the people (public) and 
domestic animals is not a purpose for which UDOT could acquire fee title to G. Kay, 
Inc.'s land, and if otherwise permissible to be acquired by UDOT, the estate taken can 
only be an easement for public use. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-2(2)." 
Because the above "argument" is essentially an unsupported assertion, Defendant 
has effectively waived the right to consideration of the alleged issue on appeal. As stated 
in U.S. v. DunkeL 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991), "A skeletal 'argument,' really 
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim." Further, "[a] reviewing court 
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and research." 
Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)). 
Finally, as stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1998), "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed 
arguments." But even on the merits, Defendant's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-
2(2), which is cited for the proposition that UDOT cannot acquire fee title, is misplaced, 
because the statutory authority for condemnation in the present case falls under the 
"Rights-of-way Act," which reads at Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(2)(a)(i) as follows: 
(2)(a)(i) Title to real property acquired by the department or the 
counties, cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, 
condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-of-way or other 
transportation purposes may be in fee simple or any lesser estate or 
interest. 
POINT II. CONDEMNATION OF MITIGATION PROPERTY IS AUTHORIZED 
UNDER UTAH LAW 
UDOT's authority to condemn for mitigation as a "state transportation purpose" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (2001) could not be more clear. The plain language of 
this section, which was amended effective March 9, 2001, and thus applied to the instant 
Resolution of Condemnation dated April 17, 2001 (R. 8) specifically provides for 
mitigation as follows: 
As used in this part, "state transportation purposes" includes: 
* * * 
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, 
maintenance, and mitigation from the effects of these activities on 
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state highways and other transportation facilities under the control of 
the department; 
* * * 
(12) the mitigation of impacts from public transportation projects. 
(Emphasis added) 
Based on UDOT's Complaint and Condemnation Resolution (R. 1-8), Defendant's 
property was sought "for the purpose of mitigating the impacts of construction . . . on 
state highways, or the mitigation of impacts from public transportation projects . . . 
subject to acquisition under S.B. 256, Transportation Amendments . . . " Moreover, Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-1-201(4) provides an additional mandate that UDOT "plan, develop, 
construct, and maintain state transportation systems that are safe, reliable, [and] 
environmentally sensitive. . ." (Emphasis added) 
The general statutory authority governing eminent domain, found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-1, states that "the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the 
following public uses": 
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United 
States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
public uses authorized by the Legislature." (Emphasis added) 
Where a public use has been authorized by the legislature, the courts have held that 
a "statute granting [a] right of eminent domain for [a] particular purpose must be liberally 
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construed in furtherance of such purpose." Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 119 F.2d 16, 19-20 (10th Cir. 1941). Further, a statute "must be construed, 
wherein it may require construction, and applied to any particular case with as much 
liberality as its language will permit in order to carry out [the] purpose which [the] 
legislative power had in mind . . ." Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Haves Estate, Inc., 31 
P.2d 624, 627 (Utah 1934), cert, denied, 295 U.S. 742 (1935). As stated by the United 
States Supreme Court, "Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the 
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract 
to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Berman 
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that property is taken for a public use "within 
the meaning of the law when the taking is for a use which will promote the public 
interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the 
commonwealth." Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371, 373 (Utah 1904), aff d, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). 
Further, 'public use5 is determined by the character of use rather than the extent of use. 
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1933). "Once a court decides that the 
taking of property is for a public use, then the judicial function is exhausted, and the 
extent, amount, or title of property to be taken lies within administrative determination, 
subject only to the requirement that just compensation be paid." Ledford v. Corps of 
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Eng'rofthe United States, 500 F.2d 26,28 (6th Cir. 1974) (relying on Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)). 
With regard to Defendant's contention that UDOT did not have authority to 
condemn its property for mitigation, Defendant's argument is seemingly based, at least in 
part, on the contention that UDOT lacks authority to condemn, because the Legislature 
did not further define or provide guidelines regarding the terms "mitigation" and 
"impacts."Notwithstanding this contention, however, Defendant has provided no 
supporting case law or authority, no marshaling of facts, and no intelligible reasons or 
argument as to any error on the part of the District Court. Accordingly, Defendant has 
waived any right to have any such issue heard on appeal. But even on the merits, the 
record suggests no reasonable basis for any claim of ambiguity over legislative intent. As 
stated in People v. Matelec, 641 N.W. 2d 252, 256, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), 
"In [construing statutes], our purpose is to discern and give effect to 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by examining the plain language 
of the statute; where the language is unambiguous, we presume the 
meaning clearly expressed - no further judicial construction is 
required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. 
We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary 
meaning, and only where statutory language is ambiguous may we 
look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. [People 
v. Morev, 461 Mich. 325, 329 330, 603 N.W. 2d 250 (1999) 
(citations omitted).] 
In determining the plain meaning of statutory language, "'[t]he fair 
and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject 
matter of the law, is what should govern' . . . and as far as possible, 
effect must be given to every word, phrase, and clause in the 
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statute." WL at 330, 603 N.W. 2d 250, quoting People ex rel. 
Twitchell v. Blodgett. 13 Mich. 137, 168 (1865) 
In the present case, Defendant has shown no ambiguity. Moreover, Defendant's 
own Exhibit 7 clearly shows that the legislature granted UDOT the power to condemn for 
purposes of mitigation, including wetlands mitigation. Defendant's Exhibit 7. 
Defendant's Exhibit 7 is attached as Addendum A. As to Defendant's claim of an 
"unlawful delegation of legislative powers," this contention is unsupported by relevant 
case law or authority, and is devoid of any reasoned argument or analysis. Further, 
Defendant's reliance on Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co„ 421 P.2d 504 
(Utah 1966) is misplaced and has no application to the present case. In that case, the 
legislature failed to spell out the area over which plaintiff was to exercise its functions, 
rendering the act creating the Great Salt Lake Authority invalid. Additionally, the Act did 
not identify with clarity the powers, duties, or responsibilities of the Great Salt Lake 
Authority, or even include eminent domain as a means of property acquisition. By 
contrast, the jurisdiction of UDOT is statewide and the powers exercised here are defined 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102, and are clearly tied in the instant case to the 
Legacy Project and Nature Preserve. With regard to Utah Department of Transportation 
v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), exercise of the power of eminent domain under the 
doctrine of necessary implication is not at issue in the present case because condemnation 
for purposes of mitigation has been specifically authorized by statute. As set forth below, 
case law and authority cited to by the Fuller court further buttress the fact that UDOT's 
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selection of Defendant's property was in accordance with established legal precedent, and 
that legislative delegation of powers to UDOT was likewise consistent with established 
legal precedent. 
[7] As to the selection of the particular site for the sewage lagoon, the 
general rule was stated by this Court in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Utah 
v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 23 Utah 474, 484, 485, 65 P. 735, 739 
(1901), as follows: 
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation 
exercising the power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty 
of oppression, its discretion in the selection of land will not be 
interfered with. With the degree of necessity or the extent which the 
property will advance the public purpose, the courts have nothing to 
do. When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of 
appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial 
cognizance. (Citations omitted). 
The limitation on the scope of judicial review of the selection of sites taken 
under eminent domain powers is also described in 1 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, (Hereafter Nichols), s 4.11(3), at 4-184, 4-185: 
(T)he legislature may, and usually does, delegate the power of 
selecting the land to be condemned to the public agent that is to do 
the work; in such case it makes little, if any, difference whether the 
grant of authority is, in terms, limited to such land as is "necessary" 
for the purpose in view, for a general grant of authority carries the 
same limitation by implication and in either case the necessity is for 
the condemnor and not for the courts to decide, and the decision of 
such condemnor is final as long as it acts reasonably and in good 
faith. (Emphasis added) 
POINT III. CONDEMNATION OF DEFENDANT'S MITIGATION PROPERTY IS 
REASONABLY NECESSARY TO AN AUTHORIZED PUBLIC USE. 
Where a taking for public use is authorized by law, a determination under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-4 that the taking is necessary to such use "merely requires that the 
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land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement." Williams v. Hyrum 
Gibbons & Sons, 602 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1979). Under Williams, "necessity" does not 
require that a project or improvement would fail without the taking of the specific land 
sought, but only that the property be reasonably requisite and proper for the 
accomplishment of the purpose sought. Thus, particular questions as to the route, 
location, or amount of property to be taken are to be left to the sound discretion of the 
condemning authority absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence that such 
determinations are the product of fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness." Williams at 688. As 
similarly stated in Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 
1978), 
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising the 
power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its 
discretion in the selection of land will not be interfered with. With the 
degree of necessity or the extent which the property will advance the public 
purpose, the courts have nothing to do. When the use is public, the 
necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a 
subject of judicial cognizance. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In the instant case, the District Court specifically found "[t]hat Defendant's 
property. . . [met] the selection criteria for mitigation property required or needed by the 
State of Utah for the Legacy Project and Nature Preserve," and "[tjhat the acquisition of 
Defendant's property for mitigation . . . [was] requisite and reasonably necessary to an 
authorized state transportation purpose" (R. 25). The supporting evidence and testimony 
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relied upon by the District Court includes unrebutted testimony from engineer and 
environmental expert Richard D. Gorton, Supervisory Biologist for the Army Corps of 
Engineers, Brooks Carter, and the affidavit and in-court testimony from Legacy Project 
Director Byron Parker. TR at 16-141, 162-163; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, and (R. 46-157). 
Mitigation is a term applied to all kinds of impacts and the term used to try to offset those 
impacts. TR at 21-22. A plan was prepared for the Legacy Project which included both 
wetlands and uplands. TR at 24-25. Both direct and indirect functional losses to 
wetlands were quantified and wetlands scientists familiar with hydrogeomorphic (HGM) 
methodology developed a series of equations that could be used to quantify both the 
impact and effectiveness of mitigation. TR. at 28-29, 36. Selection of mitigation 
properties, including Defendant's property, was correctly determined in accordance with 
accepted methodology and met the requisite criteria for mitigation property. TR. at 30, 
47. As called for by the plan, Defendant's property is located west of the highway and 
close to the highway in terms of area it would impact. TR at 30. 
Although Defendant contends that its property may not be taken for mitigation, it 
has failed to marshal evidence pertinent to the District Court's Findings, and has further 
failed to argue or explain whether or how the District Court erred in finding that the 
taking met the selection criteria as a necessary taking pursuant to an authorized state 
transportation purpose. As noted in Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931, 
Our standard for overturning factual findings is a rigorous one - we 
may not set aside such findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
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Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990); Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a). To establish clear error, "[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'. . . . " In 
re Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This burden "is a heavy one, 
reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when an appellant fails to 
carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider 
the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as 
valid. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 
553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Because of Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the District Court's 
Findings regarding selection criteria, and requisite, reasonably necessary acquisition must 
be accepted as valid. As stated in Saunders, Id., "[w]e are . . . obliged to consider the 
findings from the standpoint of the supporting evidence and not from appellant's view of 
the way he or she believes the facts should have been found." (Citing Ashton v. Ashton, 
733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).) 
POINT IV: DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO RAISE ISSUES OF 
FEDERAL LAW, NOR ARE FEDERAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
At Points II and V of its brief, Defendant raises issues of federal law which are 
irrelevant to this appeal. Defendant's Point II caption reads: "The United States Supreme 
Court Limits the Clean Water Act to Navigable Waters of the United States." And, 
Defendant's Point V caption states: "It is Improper for UDOT to Attempt to Acquire 
Land to Satisfy any Agreement It Has with Federal Agencies Even if the Agreement Were 
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Enforceable." Inasmuch as Defendant's Point II fails to provide any "citation to the 
record" as required by Ut. R. App. P. 24(5)(A), the issue is not preserved for appeal. 
Moreover, the argument contains no intelligible statement of "contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented. . . .," but consists, rather, of an 
arbitrary selection of lengthy quotations from federal cases with no accompanying 
reasoning or analysis. Where no analysis is provided, this Court should decline to address 
the issue on appeal and should assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Irrespective of the inadequacy resulting from Defendant's failure to properly brief, 
the Army Corps of Engineers is not a party to this action. Consequently, Defendant does 
not have standing to raise or adjudicate questions of federal jurisdiction in state court over 
wetlands jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers. Moreover, federal jurisdiction is 
largely irrelevant because the ultimate authority and power to condemn is governed by 
state law. 
Given the fact that condemnation for mitigation is specifically authorized by state 
law, Defendant lacks standing to challenge UDOT's exercise of discretion in working and 
cooperating with federal officials or agencies. But even if such cooperation were 
properly at issue, the state of Utah and UDOT have nevertheless acted lawfully to 
accommodate the interests of the State of Utah in the protection of wetlands, wildlife 
habitat, and other natural resource values. Further, federal agencies did not direct UDOT 
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to acquire any particular mitigation property (R. 50-51). Rather, it was the state of Utah 
that has proposed the quality, quantity and location for mitigation that it deemed 
appropriate and feasible based on its own judgment (R. 50). Although Utah may establish 
a mitigation plan that satisfies federal officials, and which also satisfies the mitigation 
goals of the state, it was UDOT, not the federal government, that made a final selection 
and proposal of Defendant's property for acquisition. 
On the merits, Defendant's federal arguments are based on an erroneous 
interpretation and application of federal law. The representation, for instance, that 
"[n]one of the waters in Davis County are jurisdictional waters of the United States, and 
[that] none are considered navigable waters of the United States is legally and factually 
wrong. Moreover, Defendant's reliance on Hanes v. State, 973 P.2d 330 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1999), is misplaced because the case has little or no relevance to the question of 
federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The Hanes court dealt with the question 
of whether a state could enforce its game and fish laws against an Indian fishing off of 
tribal lands. More specifically, the case concerned treaties with the Cherokee Tribe and 
the ownership interests of the tribe, the state, and the United States over the riverbed, as 
opposed to the interests of any riparian property owners. Defendant's reliance on Solid 
Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'r. 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) ("SWANCC"), is likewise 
misplaced. And, contrary to Defendant's quotations from the case syllabus, the narrow, 
specific holding in SWANCC was that the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) could not 
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rely on the "Migratory Bird Rule" alone as support for an administrative finding that the 
body of water at issue in that case was a jurisdictional wetland under the Clean Water 
Act. Under SWANCC, the court held that the Corps of Engineers must also show a 
hydrological connection to a water of the U. S. in order to establish the requisite 
jurisdiction. As to "navigable waters" specifically, the SWANCC court stated: 
The term "navigable waters" as defined under the Act [CWA] as 
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." [33 
U.S.C.] § 1362(7). The Corps has issued regulations defining the 
term "waters of the United States" to include 
"waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, 
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural 
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which 
could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . " 33 
CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1999) at 163. 
Based on the foregoing, SWANCC does not turn on an understanding of 
"navigable waters" in any traditional sense. Rather, the SWANCC court expressly 
confirmed guidance previously provided in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), as follows: "In Riverside Bayview Homes we recognized that 
"the term "navigable" is of "limited import" and that Congress evidenced its intent to 
"regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical 
understanding of that term." SWANCC at 167 quoting Riverside at 133. In Riverside, 
the United States Supreme Court stated "that a definition of 'waters of the United States' 
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has 
jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the Act." Riverside at 135. The Court 
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further observed, in pertinent part, that " . . . Congress rejected measures designed to curb 
the Corps' jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection of wetlands 
would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of 'navigable waters.'" Id. at 137. 
"As the House Report explained; "'Navigable waters' as used in section 301 includes all 
of the waters of the United States including their adjacent wetlands." IcL at 138. 
As indicated above, Defendant's position that a "navigable water" must be capable 
of sustaining boat traffic under the Clean Water Act is obviously wrong. And, where 
there is a hydrological connection to a water of the United States, such as the Great Salt 
Lake, the Army Corp of Engineers would clearly have jurisdiction over those wetlands 
under the Clean Water Act. The next case, Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971), 
dealt with fee ownership of the shorelands and beds underlying the waters of the Great 
Salt Lake. Accordingly, that case has no relevance to federal jurisdiction over adjacent 
wetlands, or to the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause. Lastly, State 
Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Company, 789 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 
1990) is likewise irrelevant. In that case, the state of Colorado brought an eminent 
domain proceeding to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks. The 
Colorado Supreme Court held, as to the State Department of Highways, that it did not 
have statutory authority to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks of a 
landlocked sheep ranch operator. By contrast, in this case, UDOT does not seek to 
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acquire property for the benefit of a private party, but is instead seeking property for 
mitigation purposes as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the 2001 Legislative Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102, 
Defendant's property may properly be taken for mitigation. The language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous, and well-established legal precedent requires that the statute be 
liberally construed in furtherance of its stated purpose. With regard to whether the taking 
was pursuant to an authorized public use, the District Court found that Defendant's 
property met the required selection criteria and that the taking was requisite and 
reasonably necessary based on an extensive record of unrebutted evidence and expert 
testimony considered at hearing. Inasmuch as Defendant has failed to marshal the 
evidence or to provide any reasoned bases in support of its arguments, the decision and 
findings of the District Court should be affirmed. Plaintiff therefore respectfully seeks 
this Court's affirmance of the District Court's decision and findings. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 k 7day of July, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
EDWARD O. OGILVIE * 
Assistant Attorney General 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two true copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, on this 3/5?dayofJuly2002,to: 
George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Defendant G. Kay, Inc. 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
EDWARD O. 6GILVIE ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
30 
ADDENDUM A 
b-7 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TAPES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE 
ON SENATE BILL 256, SESSION 2001 
Transcribed by George K. Fadel 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE: 
Senate Bill 256, Transportation Amendment. 
Senator Knudsen: 
Senate Bill 256 basically does two things: it allows for the 
Department of Transportation to acquire rights of way for public 
transit projects, and it also addresses the fact and gives UDOT 
authority to condemn property for mitigation purposes associated 
with the highway project. I might talk a little bit about examples 
of mitigation—property for construction of a pedestrian overpass; 
domestic animal or wild life crossings; wetland protection or 
replacementf property for noise reduction; water well protection; 
historic property protection; archeological and paleontological 
resources protection and a combination of recreation uses such as 
bikes or off-road vehiclesf parks and sidewalks. Those are some 
of the mitigation issues. 
Any questions? Questions of Senator Knudsen? 
Senator Brandel: I don't have any question. I'd like to stand in 
support of this bill. Many of you know that for several years I 
served on the Public Transit Authority Board and one of the 
problems that we have, whether you are for or against public 
transit, one of the issues is whether or not we will be able to 
build these systems or whether a citizen ought to be able to hold 
us hostage as a community in acquiring property. Nowf I'm opposed 
to condemnation and opposed to that process but I believe that this 
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bill will solve a probJLem. If I am not mistaken, Senator Knudsen, 
when we built the Trax project there were several instances where 
a city or town committed to use their eminent domain—they put it 
in writing that they would use their eminent domain and then 
subsequently reneged on that. And this doesn't give carte blanche 
to do anything but it does provide a mechanism in those rare cases 
where it is important, so I rise in support of this. 
Any other questions of Senator Knudsen? (Knudsen): Seeing 
no further questions, Mr. President, I move under suspension of the 
rules that Senate Bill 256 be considered read for the second and 
third time and be up for final passage. (President): We're not 
doing that. (Knudsen): I rescind my motion and restate it. I 
move that Senate Bill 256 be read for the third time. Roll call. 
Senate Bill 256 has received 24 aye votes, no nay votes, 2 senators 
absent passes to the third reading calendar. We now go to Senate 
bill 226. 
Next hearing; 
Senate bill 256, Transportation Amendment, Senator Knudsen. 
Knudsen: Thank you, Mr. President. The Transportation 
Amendment basically does two things. It modifies the 
transportation code by allowing the Department of Transportation 
to acquire rights of way for public transportation projects and it 
clarifies that UDOT has the authority to condemn property for 
mitigation purposes associated with a highway project. That is the 
purpose of the bill. 
Questions of Senator Knudsen on this bill? Seeing none. 
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Seeing no questions, Mr. President, I move that Senate Bill 
256 be up for final passage. Vote: Senate Bill 256 having 
received 26 aye votes, no nay votes, and three being absent, passes 
and will be referred to the House. Next we will deal with Senate 
Bill 226. 
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PROCEEDINGS, IN THE UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SENATE BILL 256 
2001 SESSION 
Transcriber: George K. Fadel 
Transportation Amendment. Senator Knudsen, Senator Bush 
Thank youf Mr. Speaker. Senate Bill 256 is a Transportation 
Amendment. It's more or less of a housekeeping item. It modifies 
the Motor Transportation Code to in areas in which it scratches out 
highways and puts transportation purposes. In other words, instead 
of saying State Highways, says State Transportation purposes to 
include more things in it. And another thing it is doing is 
including mitigation in this part of their duties in things they 
do to acquire rights of way and mostly that's it. Another part 
saying the property acquired for public transit projects shall be 
transferred to the public district responsible for the project. 
It's just more of less updating a few things that they need to have 
in the statute. So with that I am ready for a few questions. 
Representative Dillary: I'd like to make an amendment under 
my name. Amendment 2f dated February 27. What this does if 
approved by two-thirds of the member, it provides, an immediate 
date to allow UDOT to deal with some issues right now as it relates 
to mitigation. Further discussion of the motion to amend? 
Representative Bush: I never heard of it before. In fact I 
didn't know about this bill until about five minutes ago but I 
would certainly think that Representative Dillary is presenting his 
as something that I would think would be fine with the sponsor of 
the bill. Further discussion to the motion to amend? The 
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amendment for further discussion. Representative Dillary for 
summation, I'll waive summation. It is Amendment #2 in. 
Representative Dillary's name. Those in favor of the motion to 
amend say aye. Opposed say no. Motion passes. Bill will be 
amended. Further discussion of the bill as amended. Senator Bush, 
back to you for summation. 
Senator Bush: Thank. I believe I have said enough about 
this, so I ask for a favorable vote. 
Thank you. Voting is open on Senate Bill 256 as amended. 
5 
